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NOTES
CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION ON THE "TRANSFER" OF
APPRECIATED PROPERTY FROM HUSBAND TO WIFE
PURSUANT TO A DIVORCE SETTLEMENT
UNITED STATES V. DAVIS:' THE SITUATION AND HISTORY
Pursuant to a voluntary property settlement, later incorporated into
a divorce decree, the taxpayer transferred to his former wife five hun-
dred shares of stock whose market value was then $82,250 but whose
cost basis was $74,775.37.' The settlement was in satisfaction of all
her rights against the taxpayer, including, but not limited to, dower.
The United States Court of Claims ruled against the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue's determination of a taxable gain on the transfer of
the stock.' Since the decision of the court of claims was in conflict with
prior determinations by both the Second and Third Circuit Courts of
Appeals although in accord with a Sixth Circuit ruling,4 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. The Court found the Davis transaction to be
an exchange of property and thus a recognized taxable event not other-
1. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
2. The adjusted basis would be determined by INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1011,
1012, 1016. Here the adjusted basis would probably be the cost to the taxpayer plus
brokerage fees. Capital gain is the amount "realized" on the sale or other disposition
of capital assets minus the adjusted basis. Id., § 1001(a). The amount "realized" is
the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of any property other than
money received on the sale or other disposition of the capital asset. Id., § 1001 (b). In
a sale or exchange the amount of gain "realized" will usually be "recognized" for tax
purposes and a capital gain tax levied on it. Id., § 1002.
3. United States v. Davis, 287 F.2d 168 (1961).
4. The court of claims found there may have been economic gain but there was no
taxable gain, because capital gain on transferred property is determined by the fair
market value of the property received for it. The former wife's dower and alimony
rights released to the husband in the court approved settlement agreement could not be
valued with any satisfactory degree of accuracy. The court refused to use any value
placed on the property which the husband transferred because that was the property
which ultimately needed evaluation. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1001 (b). This followed
the reasoning of Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1960). Originally
the Board of Tax Appeals in Mesta v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 933 (1940), ruled that
a similar transaction did not incur a capital gains tax because the settlement was in the
nature of a property division and not a taxable event, and because the wife's rights could
not be adequately valued. In Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941), the
Board was overruled and a taxable event was found. The value of Mrs. Mesta's rights
was found to be the value of the property Mr. Mesta transferred to her. Commissioner
v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942), followed Mesta. The inconsistent Marshman
case was the next to arise some eighteen years later.
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wise excepted from taxation.'
The Court reasoned that the taxpayer's wife released or transferred
her rights of succession and alimony to her husband when the divorce
settlement was approved by the court and in exchange she received the
lump sum payment of appreciated stock. For capital gain purposes the
value of the transferred stock is the value of the rights received therefor,'
but here the value of the rights received by the taxpayer was determined
by the fair market value of the transferred stock itself.7 Dower and ali-
mony rights are difficult to value in the abstract, but here they were held
to be worth what was paid for them in a transaction that was found to
be at arms-length.8 Consequently, if the Davis transaction is a transfer
which should properly be taxed, this circuitous method of valuation does
provide a practical solution.
Even though the Davis decision was unanimous it is still subject to
question in several respects. The taxpayer contended there was a divi-
sion of property rather than a transfer; a position which the Court
recognized as not completely illogical. A division would require stock
ownership by the wife prior to divorce, and though the Court recognized
that the transaction was no ordinary transfer, still they viewed the wife's
rights as "a burden on the husband's property rather than [making] ...
the wife a part owner thereof."9 Even though the husband was the sole
legal owner of the property transferred, the economic consequences of
the transaction so resemble those of a property division that the trans-
fer could easily have been treated as such. This discussion will also con-
sider whether (1) Davis type transactions should be taxed as divisions of
property in order to be consistent with other income taxation provisions,
and to provide equality with community property states; (2) the trans-
action should be one of a group where capital gain is "realized" but not
"recognized," and (3) because of the effect of taxation on domestic re-
lations law, the parties and divorce negotiations, the Davis situation
should be exempt from capital gain taxation. The possibility of a gift
was refuted and will not be treated.
CHARACTER OF A WIFE'S RIGHTS
Dower. By Delaware law a wife has succession rights to at least
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1002.
6. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 71-72 (1962).
7. Ibid.
8. The process of valuation has been contested and upheld, and has been ex-ten-
sively reviewed in the following: 61 COLUm. L. Rav. 101 (1961); 74 HARv. L. REV. 1226
(1961); 7 How. L. J. 64 (1961); 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 773 (1961); 109 U. PA. L. Rv. 438
(1961).
9. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 70 (1962).
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one-third of her deceased husband's personalty and one-third of the
realty of which he was seized during marriage."0 Since she must succeed
him, it is a contingent right. Unlike ownership, she has no control over
the property of her living husband except to the extent that she may re-
fuse to release her dower rights in realty he seeks to convey. 1 But the
retention of dower rights in conveyed property and the variable value of
a wife's claim are unlike ordinary claims against property. Whereas a
tortfeasor will have a maximum limit placed upon the reparations he
must pay, and the person he has injured cannot affect that amount, a wife,
by hard work or frugality, can substantially increase the final value of
her succession rights. Her rights arise from the marital relationship and
depend on a trust deeper than that on which most creditors would rely,
for a husband can dissipate his assets and defeat his wife's expectations.
A wife may actually have earned much of the property to which her hus-
band holds title and she usually contributes to their joint welfare in
many intangible ways. On a husband's death the law protects his
wife by the legal transfer it found unnecessary during marriage. Her
economic position at her husband's death is protected by her succession
rights, though it often is hardly different than had she ozwned a share of
his property during marriage. Indeed her rights against the deceased
husband's personalty are subordinated to the rights of creditors. 2
Alimony. On divorce for the husband's aggression, Delaware re-
stores his wife's property, either in gross sum or annual allowance."
Since alimony is commonly considered a commutation of the husband's
duty to support his wife, a man effectively has the duty to support his
wife from the date of marriage until he dies or in some cases until she
remarries. 4 Unlike most claims which are for fixed amounts, the value
of a wife's support rights during marriage varies continuously with her
husband's fortunes. At divorce, when a wife's rights will become
periodic payments or a gross sum alimony payment, her claim is still
unlike ordinary claims. This is because courts commonly use one-third
to one-half of a husband's property as a starting point for a gross sum
alimony payment, and a wife may contribute substantially to her ali-
10. DEL.. CODE ANN. tit. 12 §§ 502, 901, 904, 905 (1953); § 512 (1953), as amended
by § 512 (Supp. 1962).
11. DE. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 901 (1953).
12. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 512 (1953), as amended by § 512 (Supp. 1962).
13. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1531 (1953).
14. FucHs, MATERIALS FOR COURSE IN DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 179 (1959); 17 Am.
JUR., Divorce and Separation, § 653 (1957). A wife's remarriage constitutes strong
grounds for terminating alimony or reducing its amount. See Annot., 112 A.L.R. 246,
253 (1938).
NOTES
mony award by her industry and frugality during marriage."5 The
whole process of awarding alimony largely on a percentage basis ad-
justed by other factors resembles a division of property between part-
ners." Indiana specifically treats the allocation of alimony as a property
division even though during marriage a wife has no legal title to a share
of his property. 7 Moreover the divorce award of property to a wife in
Indiana cannot exceed a husband's ownership, and its purpose is to place
a wife in as good a position as though she had just survived her hus-
band.' The community property system protects wives by recognizing
joint legal ownership.'" In a community property state the Court would
very likely reach a result contrary to Davis, and it could conceivably con-
sider the transaction a division in a common law state such as Indiana.
While the economic results of divorce are similar to those which
would result if there were a division of jointly owned property, it is true
that a wife lacks the legal right to control which is a necessary attribute
of ownership. However, marriage is effectively a joint enterprise with
few reservations. The duty to support and to pay alimony regards the
parties as completely independent individuals which they are not. The
legal theory of transfer, which is used to secure to a wife a reasonable
share when her husband will no longer voluntarily provide it, is only a
means within the framework of the common law of recognizing, at a
time when her best interests can no longer be entrusted to her husband,
the equality of husband and wife and their effective joint ownership.
COMMUNITY OF INTEREST IN OTHER AREAS
It is recognized in several other areas that the marital relationship
creates a community of interest economically similar to a partnership or
joint venture. For example, it is recognized by the weight of authority
that an innocent party to an invalid marriage is entitled to an equitable
division of the property accumulated by the joint efforts of the parties
15. Lyon v. Lyon, 21 Corn. 184 (1851); Hull v. Hull, 274 Wis. 140, 79 N.W.2d
653 (1956) ; MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS, § 97-98 (1931) ; 17 AM. Jul.,
Divorce and Separation, § 685 (1957).
16. Factors affecting the amount of alimony decreed include necessities of the
wife, husband's financial ability and capacity to earn, parties' social standing, their
health and age, wife's earning capacity and ability to find employment, and their con-
duct. 17 AM. Ju., Divorce and Separation, § 688 (1957). "Probably the most im-
portant element . . . is the financial condition of the parties." A wife in good financial
condition may be denied any alimony but her assistance in accumulation of the property
is also a factor. 17 AM. Jum., Divorce and Separation, § 689 (1957).
17. Shula v. Shula, 235 Ind. 210, 132 N.E.2d 612 (1955) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1218
(Burns Supp. 1962). This is an equivalent of the wife receiving at least her statutory
forced share so that the husband does not benefit by his wrong doing.
18. Ibid.
19. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIc RELATIONS, §§ 97-98 (1931).
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to the "marriage."2  The family expense doctrine2' and the family
purpose doctrine2 both recognize the family as an economic unit. More-
over, in some jurisdictions one spouse may not receive a bequest from a
third person when the other spouse was a witness to the will and is neces-
sary for its probate.22
The economic effect of marriage is for a wife to acquire for the life
of her husband the benefit of a portion of all property that he acquires.
A wife's equitable interests against her husband at divorce are not legal
interests, but for the most part they are protected by the discretion of
the court. Until death, or sometimes remarriage, the same two people
continue to live on the same property or income after divorce as before,
but they are burdened with the additional expenses of maintaining sepa-
rate homes.
CAPITAL GAINS THEORY AND TAX TREATMENT AT DIVORCE
Capital gains tax is a single payment substitution for the ordinary
annual income tax that would be levied on the property's appreciation in
value.2" Taxes on "recognized" capital gains are paid when "realized"
by sale or exchange,22 which occurs "when the last step is taken by which
he [the taxpayer] obtains the fruition of the economic gain which has
already accrued to him,' 6 and means that additional gain or loss will
no longer affect the person to be taxed. This is a proper time for taxa-
tion because the taxpayer usually has money or new assets, which could
20. See cases listed at Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1255 (1953). Each party has an in-
terest in the property and restoring the status quo requires a division. The Indiana
alimony theory is more analogous to an annulment partition than states permitting ali-
mony as a substitute for future support. Nevertheless the woman's equity is recognized
at an annulment proceeding. Sclamberg v. Sclamberg, 220 Ind. 209, 41 N.E.2d 801
(1942).
21. The husband and wife are jointly and severally liable for all expenditures in-
curred for, on account of, and to be used in the family, and this embraces much more
than mere common law necessaries. O'Haran v. Leiner, 306 Ill. App. 230, 28 N.E.2d
315 (1940) ; Smedley v. Felt, 41 Iowa 588, 590 (1875). Rent for family dwelling, Har-
rison v. Hill, 37 Ill. App. 30 (1890), and clothing, Ross v. Johnson, 125 Ill. App. 65
(1906), are family expense items.
22. The owner of an automobile who makes it available for his family's pleasure and
convenience is liable for injuries caused by their negligence while operating it on a
family purpose. The doctrine is designed to protect the public generally from insolvent
minors who cause injuries while operating their parents' automobiles. Richardson v.
True, 259 S.W.2d 70, 71 (Ky. 1953) ; McNamara v. Prather, 277 Ky. 754, 127 S.W.2d
160, 161 (1939).
23. Powers v. Codwise, 172 Mass. 425, 52 N.E. 525 (1899); Sullivan v. Sullivan,
106 Mass. 474 (1871) ; MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 6, § 2 (1955).
24. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 22.01 (1958).
25. A gain which is realized by sale or exchange is usually recognized and a tax
assessed. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1002. But see INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1031-37,
1051-55, 1071, 1081-83.
26. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 115 (1940).
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be sold to pay the tax, and he can no longer benefit or lose from the
property whose appreciation and transfer resulted in the imposition of
a tax.
The transfer by trustees of securities which had appreciated in value
while held by the trustees in partial satisfaction of a legacy has been held
to result in a taxable capital gain. 7 Similarly a transfer of appreciated
capital assets in satisfaction of a taxpayer's tort liability would probably
result in a taxable capital gain. Neither of these transfers generate any
money in the transferor; however the recipient is an independent person
with a fixed monetary claim which would not fluctuate in value as would
a wife's claim before it is fixed by the divorce decree. Income is taxed
to the person who earns it and receives, or causes another to receive, the
economic benefits of it. 8  The economic effects of taxation are signifi-
cant in determining ownership of the income for tax purposes. Regard-
less of what alimony theory is applied, if income taxation reduces a wife's
reasonable share, she is taxed as the owner of that amount. Although
her reasonable share is transformed into a liquidated sum by judicial
decree, basically her right is still to a share or percentage of her hus-
band's property. If part of his property must be used to pay tax, it is
only equitable that her lump sum be reduced. But such a reduction ef-
fectively places a capital gain tax on her as though she were the owner
of a portion of his property, but at a time when she becomes the sole
owner of that portion and is still affected by its value fluctuations.
Indefinite periodic alimony payments or those extending beyond ten
years either directly or from a trust, are the taxable income of the wife
and are not includible in the husband's gross income. 9 A lump sum
settlement payment is neither income to the wife nor a deduction for the
husband. Thus periodic payments of alimony are treated as the wife's
income and not as a debt of the husband which would require him to pay
the income tax.2" Surely there is a satisfaction of her rights for each
period just as a lump sum payment may satisfy those rights once and for
all. The alimony is her income as are dividends on stock she owns. A
lump sum payment is merely a liquidation of periodic alimony32 or the
present value of future periodic earnings. A lump sum payable in less
27. Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940).
28. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
29. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 71 (a)-(d) ; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.71-1(c) (1) (iii), 1.71-
1(c) (2) (1961). INT. REV. CODE OF 1955, § 215(a) provides for a deduction from hus-
band's gross income where he has included in his gross any amount which the wife in-
cludes under § 71.
30. Loverin v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 406 (1948).
31. See 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 593 (1961).
32. See 40 COLUm. L. REv. 677 (1940).
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than ten years is given the character of capital rather than income to
the wife, even though the same type of right is relinquished by her in
return for either periodic or permanent alimony.8" To be consistent with
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, section 71, the lump sum should
also be considered as her income rather than as a debt paid to her.
If, as the Court held, the rights of succession and a reasonable share
partake more of a liability to the husband than a property interest of the
wife, it seems only reasonable to tax the payment to the wife as her in-
come. In selling or exchanging her succession and alimony rights, her
monetary return could result in either ordinary income or capital gains.
The lump sum payment is not compensation for loss or wrong or the
periodic alimony payments would not be taxable as income of the former
wife, at least so far as they are not punitive.84
If a wife's rights are capital assets, her taxable gain is the money
and property received in exchange for them that is in excess of her ad-
justed basis.8" The basis of her alimony rights is probably zero since
they came into existence at divorce without cost.8" Neither can dower
rights arising at marriage be given a basis other than zero. Thus the full
value of the stock received would be capital gain.
If the wife's alimony rights derive from herself or her individual
efforts, the payment received in sale or exchange would surely constitute
income to her just as though she sold some of her hair or a musical com-
position.8" Since a wife is not taxed on the receipt of a lump sum ali-
mony payment, it is apparent that her rights of succession and alimony
result from the nature of marriage just as inheritance arises from our
concepts of private property and life itself. Thus a wife's rights are
compounded with her husband's property rather than independent of it.
It would be more equitable to refuse to recognize a capital gain in a Davis
situation than on an inheritance.
The fact that transfers pursuant to a divorce settlement of marital
or property rights are considered full and adequate consideration for pur-
poses of the gift tax does not control the event of taxing income.3" It
is only an easy method of settling a tangled area because full and ade-
quate consideration precludes a taxable gift.3"
33. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71.
34. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 71(a), 104(a); Treas. Regs. § 1.61-14(a) (1962).
35. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1001, 1011, 1016.
36. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1012.
37. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1302.
38. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2516.
39. Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950); Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324
U.S. 303 (1945) ; Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945).
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ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF GAIN AND TAXATION
The economic effects of gain and of ordinary income taxation
further indicate ownership of the stock prior to divorce by the wife for
the purposes of taxation. An oversimplified example is that of a re-
tired couple whose only assets are the husband's ownership of $250,000
worth of stock which has appreciated from a basis of $100,000. They
live on a five per cent return of $12,500 and each enjoys the $7,500 in-
come which appreciation has brought. If divorced and the stock was
divided equally, the wife would have $75,000 worth of stock more than
if appreciation had not occurred. Each would have a $6,250 income in-
stead of only $2,500 and the total income tax from both would remain
the same." The two people are treated as though each had earned the
decreed percentage of their fortune, as in reality they may have. The
divorce constituted a reorganization of their assets from the husband's
singular control to separate control, not their disposition, and both will
probably continue to live on the same total specie of property as before.
Should the stock become worthless tomorrow, each would share the same
misfortune as though still married. Both are economically damaged by
the partition even without the incidence of capital gains tax. Had they
sold one-half of the stock, they would of course have realized gain be-
cause its subsequent gain or loss could no longer affect them.41
This example leads to the conclusion that the capital gains tax levied
in Dazs is a penalty imposed upon the divorcees for it has the effect of
taxing both parties to the transaction. The effect created is a taxation
of a division when only a sale or exchange are supposed to be taxed. But
the conclusion that both must then be the owners is inconsistent with any
tax at all. The Court has chosen "exchange" as its premise without a
sufficient regard for consequences which indicate a different policy. Al-
though the Commissioner is anxious to receive his revenue at the earliest
possible moment, he need not necessarily lose revenue if the property's
original basis to the marriage is preserved through the divorce partition.
In the example above, without other income or deductions the husband
would normally pay about $18,000 capital gains tax. 2 Since the settle-
ment will usually be a percentage (fifty percent in the example), it is only
fair that each share be reduced by about $9,000 to $116,000. This ad-
mits a division, but in no other transaction involving capital gains is the
40. Because a married couple can file a joint return they are taxed as though one-
half of the total income was earned by each spouse. This equalizes taxation in common
law states with community property states. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2, 6013.
41. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
42. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1, 1201(b), 1202.
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person receiving the property also taxed. If the husband must bear the
tax alone without his share being larger and he then sells his share of the
stock, he will be held to have realized $150,000 gain and the former wife
none, although each received $75,000 more than if the property had not
appreciated.
THE DAVIS SITUATION IN A COMMUNITY PROPERTY STATE
In a community property state incidence of taxation follows owner-
ship of income.43 A true division of property in a divorce settlement
is not susceptible of capital gains treatment because the parties only re-
ceive what they already legally own.4" There is some dispute over what
constitutes a division of property based on whether the parties own shares
in the whole (unit theory) or a share of each species of property." The
choice has far reaching consequences; however the latter is highly the-
oretical, unrealistic and not accepted by the Internal Revenue Code of
43. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
44. Because of their theory of equal ownership, community property states raise
this point. See Frances R. Walz, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935). In this case the Commissioner
argued for a division to prevent a capital loss being claimed. The transaction was per-
sonal and not for profit because a division, so no capital loss could be claimed. See
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165 for losses confined to transactions for profit. It has
been argued that since the husband had exited from ownership and could no longer
realize gain or loss on the property after the partition that it must have been a transac-
tion for profit and capital loss should therefore have been denied. Halpern, Income Tax
Effect of Community Property Divisions Incident to Divorce, 23 CAL. ST. BAR J. 128,
135 (1948). Would this criteria include a gift? It would be better to look to the
manner of disposal in view of the kind of transactions commonly entered for profit or
to the transferor's actual profit motive. The court in Walz did this and found no profit
seeking transaction in the division. The concept of transaction for profit is basic to
capital gains treatment. In a type of transaction which normally would never bring a
gain and which is not specifically entered to obtain a gain there is no justification for
finding a gain. A transfer, the amount of which is determined as a percentage of the
transferor's total wealth, does not appear to be one intrinsically or purposefully for
profit. A legal division may transfer only actual control while an equitable division
may transfer both actual control and the ability to prevent waste. Is this a significant
difference in view of their equal economic results?
45. Frances R. Walz, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935), held an equal division of the whole
was a non-taxable division, even though the parties received entirely different kinds of
property, or the husband gave his wife money for the property value he received over
what she received. C. C. Rouse, 6 T.C. 908 (1946), aff'd 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947)
followed this general unity theory but found a capital gain existed because there was an
unequal division, and the parties had actually settled their property rights by bargain
and sale. The contrary theory that the community ownership is not in the whole but in
each specie of property may be supported by Johnson v. United States, 135 F.2d 125
(1943), though it is not clear how perfectly equal the partition would have to be. The
contention is that the wife may realize capital gain on her one-half of each piece of
property which the husband obtains and vice versa. Halpern, Income Tax Effect of
Community Property Divisions Incidnet to Divorce, 23 CAL. ST. B.AR J. 128, 138 (1948).
This would make divorce an event for recognizing all gain or loss accrued to date even
though the property remained in ownership and use of the same two people. The effect
would be the same as taxation at some point during marriage and could cause twice the
gain recognized in Davis.
NOTES
1954 for business partnerships. 6
Although the Supreme Court has not decided a Davis situation in a
community property state, it could be expected to find a division of
property and no capital gains treatment.47 Since the economic effect of
a divorce settlement under either property system is substantially the
same, a better policy, contrary to Davis, would be to heed equitable owner-
ship and economic effect of taxation rather than that legal right to con-
trol the property that resides in the husband. Income taxation is directed
toward the newly improved economic standing of the person who re-
ceived or had the right to receive the wealth. A wife is not assigned part
of the economic benefit accruing through stock appreciation but has it
inherently and to a considerable extent as a right to support. She has
also helped earn it by executing her duties in furtherance of their joint
marital undertaking.
POLICIES FAVORING EQUALITY BETWEEN COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND
COMMON LAW STATES
The Davis decision deliberately creates different tax burdens be-
tween the residents of common law and community property states. This
is not an area where the parties can always avoid transfers of appreciated
property. For example, Indiana courts "may transfer property as be-
tween the parties . . .""s and adjust property rights as in their discre-
tion is just and proper." The Davis court relied on Poe v. Seabord'
which resulted in the great disparity of treatment between residents of
common law and community property states that finally resulted in the
joint income tax return by husband and wife."' Before Congress pro-
vided relief, several states had changed their theory of property law to
obtain the lower tax rates that divided ownership of income produced for
community property state residents. 2 Congress has also extended its
policy of equal taxation to the gift and estate tax areas by enacting pro-
visions for the marital deduction, 3 and for gifts by husband or wife to
46. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 736, 751; Treas. Reg. § 1.731-1(a) (1) (i) (1961).
47. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 71 (1962).
48. Draime v. Draime, 132 Ind. App. 99, 103, 173 N.E.2d 70, 72 (1961).
49. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1218 (Burns Supp. 1962).
50. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
51. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, §§ 301-303, 62 Stat. 114-116 (1948) now found
in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2, 6013.
52. GRISWOLD, FEDERAL TAXATION 246 (5th ed. 1960).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2523. In a gift by a husband to his wife of other than
community property, one-half of the value of the gift is allowed as a deduction in ar-
riving at taxable gifts. Similarly, pursuant to § 2056 the value of a bequest devise or
inheritance to a spouse is a deduction from gross estate in arriving at taxable estate for
an amount up to fifty percent of adjusted gross estate.
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a third party.54
It is true that Congress need not adjust its tax laws to diverse state
legislation so as to cause the tax to have equal effect in all states." The
tax need not be intrinsically equal but only geographically equal so that
its method operates throughout the United States." But in the area of
income taxation Congress has shown a distinct policy of adjusting its
tax laws to the two divergent property systems." This is undoubtedly
an easier and more practical solution of the demand for equal taxation in
fact and of the broader constitutional and congressional policy of equal
taxation than revision of state property laws. It is more equitable than
ignoring the existing but unnecessary inequality. Although the stand-
ards of tax equality need not be disturbed, the substantial congressional
policy embodied in the joint tax return could have been persuasive in de-
termining the nature of the transaction or its similarity to other gains
"realized" but not "recognized." Now the matter is placed directly be-
fore Congress.
NoN TAXABLE TRANSACTIONS ANALOGOUS TO DAviS
Besides the recognition of joint ownership in provisions for equaliz-
ing the tax effects between common law and community property states,5
there are several tax areas somewhat analogous to the divorce settlement
situation but in which no capital gains taxation occurs. These trans-
actions involve "sales or exchanges" which "realize" capital gains that
are specifically not "recognized" for taxation.
Partnership or Joint Venture. A partnership or joint venture is an
unincorporated organization in which the partners actually carry on a
business venture and divide the profits therefrom." The partner has a
legal share of the production or profits which may be lost by his part-
ner's imprudence but which he nevertheless has a right to obtain by with-
drawing from the partnership. Marriage, though not strictly a business,
is surely a joint endeavor involving a division of labor that often over-
laps the parties' business and domestic duties. The effort expended for
the acquisition of the parties' wealth is more than mere investment. Al-
though profits are not literally divided and wages are not paid, both
husband and wife actually share part of the profits in their family ex-
54. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2513. A gift made by one spouse to someone other
than his spouse can be treated as though made one-half by each spouse.
55. Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12 (1927).
56. Billings v. United States, 232 U.S. 261 (1914); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S.
41 (1899).
57. NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 99 2, 6013, 2523, 2513.
58. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §9 2, 6013.
59. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 761(a)-(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a) (1961).
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penditures, and to the extent of support, she has an enforceable right to
profits. Moreover under defined circumstances a wife has a right to
obtain a divorce and enforce her reasonable share or alimony at its cur-
rent value. Although the value of such right may be diminished by her
husband's, or even her own imprudence, such right makes a wife's ex-
pectancy share an actual property interest that she may lawfully secure as
could a partner by withdrawing from the partnership.
The Income Tax Regulations provide that "no gain shall be recog-
nized to a distributee partner with respect to a distribution of property
(other than money) until he sells or otherwise disposes of such property
except as otherwise provided by section 736 . . . and section" 751.... ""
A partner's interest is in the unity of the partnership. In liquidating his
share he can only realize taxable capital gain by obtaining more money
than the basis of his share."' Otherwise he would be taxed on a paper
gain before it became income. Neither does the partnership (analogous
to an ex-husband) which distributes property or money to a partner
recognize any gain or loss."2 A business reorganization is thereby per-
mitted without tax incidence. In contrast, the imposition of a tax upon
the Davis situation, when considering marriage as a partnership, would
be to tax the property on which two people, married or separated, must
live before it leaves their economic community.
Stock Dividend. Eisner v. Macomber6 defined income as "gain de-
rived from capital, from labor or from both combined . . . [or from]
profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets."64  There,
a stock dividend of common on common with only common outstanding
was not taxable as income of the distributee under the sixteenth amend-
ment because the corporation's property was not diminished and the
shareholders' proportionate interests were not changed. Thus certain
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.731-1 (a) (1) (i) (1961).
61. Where the partner receives his share of unreceived receivables and inventory
items, his basis that remains after the deduction of any money received is first allocated
to them. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 732. When the partner disposes of the unreceived
receivables or inventory items, gain or less is generally treated as that from the sale
of non-capital assets. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 735. Thus unreceived receivables will
be taxed as income when finally disposed of and the capital assets will receive capital
gains treatment when finally disposed of, but no capital gain tax will be levied in liqui-
dation of the partnership interest unless realized in money. Where the partner receives
property instead of his share of unreceived receivables, he is treated as though he sold
them for the property and may realize ordinary income. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 751.
62. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 731(b).
63. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
64. Id. at 207. Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936) defined income, for the
purposes of stock dividends and the sixtenth amendment, as the receipt of "different
rights or interests" or a change of the "proportionate interest in the net assets of the
corporation." Thus taxing some stock transfers would be unconstitutional. Id. at 445.
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stock dividends are protected by the Constitution as prior ownership of
the distributee rather than income, and most are so treated by the In-
ternal Revenue Code, which postpones the taxation until the distributee
disposes of the stock.65 Since this change of control is permitted to be
effectuated without the incidence of an income tax on the distributee, it
is easy to understand why there is similarly no imposition of an income
tax on a change of control at divorce where there is a lump sum settle-
ment.66 The lump sum payment to a wife does not alter her economic
status much more than do stock dividends, which may alter a share-
holder's proportionate ownership of the corporation depending upon the
type of stock distributed and on which stock it is distributed. It is not
realistic to consider a wife as having earned her reasonable share by her
labor (she has no capital invested). Even if her share is income, it is
a right to a variable proportionate share of her husband's net worth on
the day of liquidation.
The most reasonable interpretation is for her alimony right to be
treated as prior ownership, just as stock dividends are, even though she
did not previously have full legal ownership. This alternative prevents
having to label her alimony rights a capital asset with a zero basis, or a
right to income which will be taxed as such, or a right to be compensated
for injury and paid with the very goods that defined the injury as
though they were stolen. Prior ownership would mean that only a trans-
fer of legal title occurred but for tax purposes a division of property
actually took place.
Corporate Reorganization. Congress has provided elaborate pro-
cedures for corporate reorganization involving exchanges of stock and
other assets but which need not incur any tax to either stockholders or
corporations.67 This is to "permit business to go forward with the re-
65. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 305(a). Stock of the declaring corporation is not
treated as property in § 317(a) and therefore not a part of dividends defined in § 316(a).
Thus the value of the stock dividend is used to reduce the adjusted basis of the stock
of the distributee and treated as a gain from sale or exchange of property only if its
value exceeds the basis of the stock already possessed. Section 301 (c) (2)-(3). When the
distributee disposes of the stock it would then be treated as a capital gain or less unless
it qualified as § 306 stock and was treated as ordinary income.
Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943) was concerned with the Eisner v. Mra-
comber situation but refused to reconsider its constitutionality and held the existing
statute did not attempt to impose an income tax on a stock dividend of common on
common with only common outstanding. Nevertheless the language of the Court and
dissent suggest that Eisner v. Macomber would have been overruled had the Court con-
sidered it.
66. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 71 (b).
67. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 354, 361, 368. The reorganization must be in pur-
suance of a plan of reorganization and not just for tax advantage. Bazley v. Commis-
sioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947).
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adjustments required by existing conditions."68  The important relevant
features of a tax free reorganization are a valid business purpose and a
continuity of interest. Those who had a proprietary interest in the
former corporation must receive for their assets a similar stock interest
in the new corporation which interest represents a substantial portion of
the value of the assets transferred.69
The concept of corporate reorganization embodied in the tax law
and required to prevent tax incidence on reorganization is an economic
adjustment of affairs analogous to that made on the "entry" into and
"exit" from marriage. If corporation A transfers some of its assets,
along with the personal efforts that go with them, to corporation B, re-
ceiving in return stock of corporation B which is distributed to A's stock-
holders, a nontaxable reorganization is effected." The stock received by
transferor A need not even be voting stock and can be redeemable at B's
option,'71 so long as a bona fide reorganization is taking placeY.7  Thus
A has given up assets in return for stock that represents a direct economic
interest in business B but lacks the control that full ownership enjoys.
Viewing individuals as economic units of self-preservation, when a
woman marries she may "invest" some of her assets, and certainly her
efforts, for an interest in the larger economic unit of marriage. Her
interest is not full ownership or legal control but neither is that of the
transferor who receives non-voting stock. The business of maintaining
a livelihood continues throughout the reorganization. No gain by the
woman is recognized in what may be a substantial monetary increase in
her economic status, because each party is thought to have given full
value. Her interest in the marriage will now fluctuate with its success
or failure just as the interest of the non-voting stockholder. He may
be able to turn his interest into cash or other property more readily than
the wife, but once grounds for divorce exist she can obtain her percentage
of the economic marital unit. The fact that she cannot convert her in-
terest into cash as readily as the stockholder is for reasons promoting
marital solidarity which certainly should not work to one's tax dis-
advantage. The Internal Revenue Code seeks to prevent penalizing an
economic effort which merely changes its form and structure without
altering the purpose of its organization or activity.
If marriage reorganizes the parties' economic activity under one
68. H.R. REP. Doc. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921).
69. LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940); Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co.,
296 U.S. 378 (1935).
70. LeTulle v. Scofield, mtpra note 69.
71. Schweitzer & Conrad Inc., 41 B.T.A. 533 (1940).
72. Ralph M. Heintz, 25 T.C. 132 (1955).
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banner, divorce will also cause a reorganization. Where a textile cor-
poration transferred to a new corporation the assets of its separate rental
enterprise and distributed all of the new corporation's stock to a mi-
nority stockholder in return for part of her stock in the textile corpora-
tion, the transaction was held a reorganization and no gain was recog-
nized by anyone. 3 It was not necessary to distribute the new corpora-
tion's stock prorata. The result was that one stockholder received a
specific piece of corporation property as a part of her interest in the
corporation. The business she received was continued and the same
people owned and were economically influenced by the same total prop-
erty after the reorganization as before, but in different detail. This is
much the same as the Davis situation except that the Court said the wife
did not legally own a share of the marriage corporation, although she
did deserve a "reasonable share" and had a power over it. Surely she is
affected more as an owner than a creditor, because the total amount she
will have a right to depends upon whether the transaction is taxed, while
a creditor would have a continuous right to a certain sum regardless of
taxation.
Miscellaneous. No capital gain is realized upon the transfer of
property as a gift or bequest, because the transferor has received nothing
in sale or exchange which is of greater value than his basis in the trans-
ferred property.74 It is conceivable that over a period of years a hus-
band could give his wife over $60,000, tax free, from his total property
of $120,000.Y Upon subsequent divorce, she might not ask for alimony
and probably could not receive very much where her financial condition
is a factor in determining alimony. The equivalent of a division of
property on divorce would be accomplished and payment of capital gains
tax would be postponed or possibly even avoided. Obviously she would
legally own such a gift and could dispose of it, but the economic status of
the marital community and its annual income tax liability would remain
unchanged. He would accomplish the future support of his wife, and
though her right to alimony remained, practically it would be worth much
less with her well provided for.
There are several other areas of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
where a gain is realized but not recognized."8 Usually this is because the
73. Rev. Rul. 164, 1958-1, CuM. BuLL. 184.
74. IrNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1001, 1002.
75. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2523 provides for a marital deduction of one-half of
the gift value. Section 2521 provides for a $30,000 specific exemption and § 2503(b)
gives an additional annual $3,000 exclusion.
76. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1031-36, 1071, 1081, 1091.
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transferor has nothing more or essentially different after the transaction
than before.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE RECOMMENDATION AND
DOMESTIC RELATIONS POLICY
In 1954 the American Law Institute recommended that the decision
of Mesta v. Commissioner,7 which imposed a capital gains tax in a trans-
action similar to Davis, be abandoned and the transfer of capital assets
not be subjected to capital gains tax. Their scheme was for all property
to retain its original basis and they commented, "since marital settle-
ments, in a sense, are involuntary exchanges it seems undesirable to im-
pose a tax at that time.""8  This was an appeal to confine capital gains
taxation to events where the transferor is, or normally would be, trying
to realize a gain that had already accrued rather than taxing unavoidable
transfers in pursuance of a valid public policy. Where one public policy
requires a redistribution of wealth to prevent a former wife from becom-
ing destitute, it seems inconsistent for another public policy to then tax
that redistribution because of its form. Clearly domestic relations policy
requiring a husband to support his wife after divorce and the policy in
favor of final settlements are given little consideration and are even
partially defeated by present taxation in this area. Possibly this stems
from an excessive concentration upon the Internal Revenue Code and its
interpretation unrelated to the effects which taxation has upon our so-
ciety. The aftermath of Poe v. Seabord' is evidence of this. It is no
answer to say that this taxation would be a deterrent to divorce or
whether such a deterrent imposed for tax reasons would be beneficial.
The states have machinery for solving marital problems, and it should not
be encumbered by taxation without a study of its effects and whether
those effects are desirable. Even then, one tax law could not serve all of
the varied state attitudes on divorce. State domestic relations law is also
of vital concern to the federal government. The Davis citation of Poe v.
Seaborie° indicates that the Court believes Congress, if anyone, should
make the change. Because of the reasons stated above and the addi-
tional difficulties imposed upon the divorce negotiations, Congress may
yet be induced to act.
EFFECT ON DIVORCE NEGOTIATIONS
A divorce negotiation is inherently fraught with ill will, sentiment
77. 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941). See note 4 supra.
78. ALl FED. INCOmE TAX STAT. § 257 (Feb. 1954 draft).
79. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
80. United States v. Davis, 320 U.S. 65, 71 (1962).
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and haggling, and many have commented on its adversities.8 The Davis
approach to appreciations in property value brings taxation immediately
into the negotiations and may preclude what might be acceptable settle-
ments because they involve the transfer of appreciated property. A hus-
band must calculate capital gains tax on the property which his wife in-
sists on receiving and must demand that a percentage of the tax be de-
ducted from her share. Naturally this will be contested. Where appre-
ciated capital assets must be transferred and the parties realize that both
will lose, they may have to adopt a periodic payment plan which does not
sever all ties and which neither prefers. At least they would have to
consider that possibility. Under the existing tax law even a transfer of
appreciated property in trust to make periodic payments to the ex-wife
is subject to capital gains treatment.82
If the basis of the property to the marriage would remain the same
and the separation transfer not taxed, possible future capital gains taxa-
tion on the disposition of the property would still have to be considered.
But its effects would not necessarily be immediate, and where neither
party had to nor wished to dispose of the property inter vivos, the basis
would be a minor consideration. 3 It would be possible for the parties to
disagree over what property to transfer because of an inequality in total
basis of each person, but this need not prevent the particular property
from being transferred. The difference in basis could be made up with
other property.
The existing law presents opportunities to transfer property which
has lost value rather than gained, thereby giving only the husband a de-
duction while in effect the wife also suffered the loss. If the husband's
property should then rise in value he could offset his carry over capital
loss against that gain and incur no tax on the sale of his share of the
property when actually it was sold for more than its adjusted basis to
him.84 Naturally the husband will wish to make the transfer when the
market is down on his stock or at least transfer to the wife property that
has lost value.
81. 61 CoLum. L. Rav. 101, 104 (1961); 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 438 (1961).
82. Rev. Rul. 507, 1957-2, Cum BULL. 511.
83. The unadjusted basis to the recipient of property acquired from a decedent is
the fair market value of the property at the date of decedent's death. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 1014. However, the unadjusted basis to a donee of property received by gift may
be the fair market value of the property when transferred on the donor's basis plus any
gift tax paid, whichever is lower. Thus the sale of appreciated property by either party
could cause them a heavy tax, a gift could cause the donee some tax when he disposed
of the property, and on bequest the property might escape capital gains taxation al-
together.
84. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201, 1202, 1211, 1212.
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Assuming that Internal Revenue Code of 1954, section 1239 per-
taining to related taxpayers would not apply to divorcees, an ex-husband
could transfer to his ex-wife property depreciated below its fair market
value (and be taxed on his gain), and she could then re-depreciate the
property over the same value.85 If he also leased the property back from
her, it would remain in the same community and be partially depreciated
twice with only capital gains tax paid on that amount receiving double
depreciation.
CONCLUSION
Whether a woman does or does not legally own a part of her hus-
band's property, it has been shown that for several purposes they are
treated as one economic community. She does have a substantial ex-
pectancy in dower and rights to support or its contingent substitute, ali-
mony. A final division of assets may be made on divorce even in com-
mon law states, and the wife has more or less power to acquire her share
depending on the available grounds for divorce. On annulment their
joint venture is recognized. Certainly she is economically tied to the
fortunes of her husband and can be of great aid to him. Consequently
her equitable share is recognized on divorce. It should also be recog-
nized by the Internal Revenue Code as the method of providing her legal
control of a share of what she helped earn or deserves by way of mar-
riage when, because of the separation, it becomes economically necessary
for her to have legal control. It has been seen that the former wife feels
the effects of taxing the transferred property just as though she was a
co-owner. Also in some instances there may not even be an exchange.
The same type of tax inequality created by Poe v. Seaborn is fos-
tered by Davis. It is now up to Congress to equate the two property
systems in this more insignificant but equally deserving area. The glare
of conflicting policies is not escapeable by statutory interpretation when
the legislature has not weighed all of the competing demands. In Davis
the Court refused to follow congressional determination for the very
similar areas of joint income tax returns, marital deductions and provi-
sion for a joint gift.
The Internal Revenue Code refuses to recognize capital gains in
other areas such as partnership distribution and corporate reorganization.
Even if the wife is not a legal owner, the effect upon her in a divorce
settlement is more like a tax exempt owner than a creditor. Where eco-
nomic conditions remain essentially the same, a formal change does not
cause one to realize gain. The wife's situation is similar and probably
85. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, §§ 167(a), (f).
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even less desirable, and though the husband is said to be taxed, she feels
it as if she were taxed.
Finally the Davis position complicates divorce negotiations and frus-
trates domestic relations purposes for what is probably an insufficient
revenue return. In the interests of fairness and consistency Congress
should overrule Davis.
INEQUITIES IN CORPORATE PAYMENTS TO WIDOWS
One of the present problem areas in income tax law is the taxability
of voluntary payments by a corporate employer to a widow or other
survivors of a deceased employee. This situation usually arises in closely
held corporations or with executive employees. The Internal Revenue
Code allows an exclusion of $5,000 to the beneficiaries or the estate of
the employee if the payments are made by reason of the death of the
employee.1 However, if the employee is entitled to receive the payments
while living, the beneficiaries or the estate of the employee do not qualify
for the exclusion The problem area concerns whether the amount in
excess of $5,000 is to be treated as income or a gift. If the payment can
qualify as a gift, it is wholly excludable from the gross income of the
recipient,3 and the corporation is able to treat the payment as an expense. 4
Recent cases in the United States Courts of Appeals have held that
amounts in excess of $5,000 are gifts,5 while other cases have held them
to be taxable income.6 The cases that have classified the payments as
1. T. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101(b).
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.101-2 (1957), provides that the exclusion does not apply to
amounts which constituted income payable to the employee during his life as compensa-
tion for services, such as bonuses, unused leave, or uncollected salary, plus other amounts
to which the employee possessed a nonforfeitable right. A nonforfeitable right in-
cludes amounts to which the employee was entitled while living if he had made an
election or demand, or upon termination of employment, such as under a pension or
profit-sharing plan.
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 102(a).
4. See, e.g., Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc., 31 T.C. 1080 (1959) ; I. Putnam, Inc.,
15 T.C. 86 (1950), acq., 1950-2 Cum. BuIL. 4.
5. Kuntz v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1962), reversing 19 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1379 (1960), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962) ; Olsen v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d
671 (8th Cir. 1962), reversing 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 807 (1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
903 (1962) ; United States v. Frankel, 302 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1962), affirming 192 F.
Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962) ; United States v. Kasyn-
ski, 284 F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1960).
6. Martin v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1962), affirming 35 T.C. 556
(1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904 (1962) ; Smith v. United States, 305 F.2d 778 (3d
Cir. 1962), affirming 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 775 (1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904
(1962).
